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(47) 
A NOT SO RETRO PROBLEM: EXTENDING STATUTES OF 
LIMITATIONS TO HOLD INSTITUTIONS RESPOSNBILE FOR CHILD 
SEXUAL ABUSE ACCOUNTABLE UNDER STATE CONSTITUTIONS 
TIMOTHY J. MUYANO* 
“I felt a little funny about it . . . .  I was 12 years old and he was an old 
man.”1 
I. ONE DAY AT A TIME: AN INTRODUCTION TO CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE IN THE 
UNITED STATES 
In 1986, twelve-year-old Patrick McSorley grieved with his schizophrenic, 
and now widowed, mother after his father’s recent suicide.2  During this difficult 
time, Father John J. Geoghan, a priest from the family’s local Roman Catholic 
parish, stopped by the family’s Boston, Massachusetts home to offer his 
condolences and take Patrick out for ice cream.3  On the way back, Geoghan 
allegedly placed his hand on the boy’s upper leg and slid his hand toward the 
child’s genitals.4  The elderly priest, whose history of sexual abuse was well 
known by his supervising personnel within the Archdiocese of Boston, soon 
began to masturbate the boy and eventually himself.5  Before being dropped off 
back at his mother’s house, Geoghan simply told Patrick, “We’re very good at 
keeping secrets.”6 
Unfortunately, stories like Patrick’s are not uncommon; one report estimates 
that 15.2% of women and 6.4% of men have endured sexual abuse as children.7  
 
 *  J.D. Candidate, 2019, Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law; B.S. 
2016, University of New Haven.  This Comment is dedicated to my mother, Mary Ellen. 
Although I lost you as my law school journey was beginning, thank you for teaching me that it 
is not about waiting for the storm to pass, but learning to dance in the rain.  I would also like to 
thank everyone on Villanova Law Review who guided and supported me throughout the writing 
process. 
1.  Michael Rezendes, Church Allowed Abuse by Priest for Years, BOS. GLOBE (Jan. 6, 
2002), https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/special-reports/2002/01/06/church-allowed-abuse-
priest-for-years/cSHfGkTIrAT25qKGvBuDNM/story.html [https://perma.cc/5VWY-K4G9] 
(quoting Patrick McSorely, a man who at only age twelve was allegedly sexually abused by 
family priest John J. Geoghan). 
2.  See id. (discussing the context of Patrick McSorely’s victimization). 
3.  See id. (discussing Geoghan’s visit to McSorely’s home after learning of father’s 
passing and offering to take the boy for ice cream). 
4.  See id. (detailing the encounter between McSorely and Geoghan). 
5.  See id. (discussing Geoghan’s history of abuse and Archdiocese of Boston’s 
knowledge of Geoghan’s sexual abuse tendencies); see also Evan Richman, Geoghan Preferred 
Preying on Poorer Children, BOS. GLOBE (Jan. 7, 2002) 
https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/special-reports/2002/01/07/geoghan-preferred-preying-
poorer-children/69DE1kOuETjphwmIBcgzCM/story.html [https://perma.cc/45ES-6MF6] 
(reporting on Geoghan’s victim preference, his psychological treatment history, frequency of 
allegations against him, and the Archdiocese of Boston’s responses to these specific 
allegations). 
6.  Rezendes, supra note 1. 
7.  See, e.g., National Center for Injury Prevention and Control, About Behavioral Risk 
Factor Surveillance System ACE Data, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Apr. 1, 
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Despite this documented prevalence, child sexual abuse (CSA) often goes 
unreported.8 
Individual perpetrators of the CSA bear the brunt of the responsibility for 
the unspeakable acts they commit against children.9  However, it is not 
uncommon for institutions that supervise, or are otherwise responsible for the 
alleged perpetrators to have contributed in some way to these heinous acts 
suffered by so many children.10  One of the most notable examples of such an 
institution is the Roman Catholic Church.11  The issue gained national attention 
in the United States after The Boston Globe Spotlight Team published a now 
famous article detailing the abuse of Patrick McSorley and countless other 
children, while also exposing the Archdiocese of Boston’s attempt to cover up 
CSA committed by priests it directly supervised.12 
Unfortunately, incidents like this are not isolated to this Roman Catholic 
diocese.13  Similar patterns of institutional mishandling of CSA have been 
 
2016), https://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/acestudy/ace_brfss.html [https://perma.cc/ 
N7JF-W8UP] (summarizing the statistics of a study examining adverse childhood experiences). 
8.  See Emily M. Douglas & David Finkelhor, Childhood Sexual Abuse Fact Sheet, 
CRIMES AGAINST CHILD. RES. CTR. (May 2005), 
http://www.unh.edu/ccrc/factsheet/pdf/childhoodSexualAbuseFactSheet.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/L9W5-SCY8] (identifying the failure of child sexual abuse to be reported as 
a problem for estimating victimization of child sexual abuse); see also NAT’L CTR. FOR VICTIMS 
OF CRIME, Child Sexual Abuse Statistics, http://victimsofcrime.org/media/reporting-on-child-
sexual-abuse/child-sexual-abuse-statistics [https://perma.cc/M7NX-8RQ7] (last visited Mar. 7, 
2018) (discussing child sexual abuse statistics based on a study about child maltreatment 
conducted by the United States Department of Health and Human Services). 
9.  See Richard Fossey & Todd A. Demitchell, “Let the Master Answer”: Holding 
Schools Vicariously Liable When Employees Sexually Abuse Children, 25 J.L. & EDUC. 575, 
576 (1996) (discussing sexual assault as an illegal act “committed for private gratification and 
fall[s] outside the scope of the perpetrator’s employment responsibilities”); see also Jennifer K. 
Weinhold, Note, Beyond the Traditional Scope-of-Employment Analysis in the Clergy Sexual 
Abuse Context, 47 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 531, 534 (2009) (explaining the concept of direct 
liability in the clergy sexual abuse context).  
10.  See Marci A. Hamilton, Child Sex Abuse in Institutional Settings: What Is Next, 89 
U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 421, 424 (2012) (noting how institutions cover up knowledge of 
pedophilia to maintain their image).  In the past, institutional-based abuse cases were kept secret 
for years and even decades, whereas the significant media attention surrounding situations 
involving the Catholic Church, Pennsylvania State University, and the Boy Scouts of America 
is a more recent phenomenon.  See id. at 423–24 (discussing the recent shift of public attention 
on institutional-based child sexual abuse over more common abuse cases that involve family or 
friends). 
11.  See id. at 425–26 (discussing several instances of child sexual abuse committed by 
Roman Catholic priests within various dioceses in the United States).  See generally Constance 
Frisby Fain & Herbert Fain, Sexual Abuse and the Church, 31 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 209 
(2006). 
12.  For a summary and discussion of The Boston Globe article and the role played in the 
sexual victimization of children by the Archdiocese of Boston, see supra notes 1–6 and 
accompanying text. 
13.  See, e.g., Snyder v. Boy Scouts of Am., Inc., 205 Cal. App. 3d 1318, 1326 (1988) 
(dismissing an action against Boy Scouts of America for alleged sexual misconduct committed 
by a scout leader because of the statute of limitations); see also DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., THE 
LAW OF TORTS § 247 n.9 (2d ed. 2017) (citing case law involving civil child sexual abuse 
actions brought against institutions); Hamilton, supra note 10, at 424 (identifying institutions 
other than the Catholic Church that have had organizational issues with child sexual abuse). 
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exposed in “the Philadelphia Roman Catholic Archdiocese, the Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-Day Saints, and among rabbis in the Orthodox Jewish and 
Hasidim communities.”14  Moreover, the transgressions of administrators at 
Pennsylvania State University (Penn State) and Jerry Sandusky, a former football 
coach at Penn State, show that CSA problems are not limited to religious 
institutions.15 
The power to hold these offending institutions accountable in civil court is 
critical to addressing institutional CSA.16  However, many victims cannot 
understand or process the physical abuse they were subject to as children or 
appreciate the importance of filing a civil cause of action in a court of law; in 
fact, many fail to recognize this as an option.17  For this reason, many CSA 
victims do not come forward until years after the actual abuse had taken place.18  
From a civil liability perspective, delayed reporting increases the risk that the 
victim may no longer be able to bring a civil suit if the statute of limitations 
period—or the time in which a party is legally permitted to file a suit—has 
expired within a given state.19  In these instances, state constitutions may prevent 
the legislature from passing laws that extend the limitations period and revive a 
 
14.  See, e.g., Callahan v. State, 464 N.W.2d 268, 269 (Iowa 1990) (ruling on child abuse 
claim in state school over span of several years); Roe v. Gelineau, 794 A.2d 476, 479 (R.I. 
2002) (hearing civil claim of alleged abuse in Catholic orphanage); see also DOBBS, supra note 
13, § 247 (discussing usual instances of child sexual abuse in non-institutional and institutional 
settings); Hamilton, supra note 10, at 425–24 (specifying institutions with a record of internal 
issues of child sexual abuse). 
15.  See Hamilton, supra note 10, at 424–25 (summarizing the child sexual abuse case 
involving Penn State and Jerry Sandusky); see also Susan Candiotti, Disturbing Emails Could 
Spell More Trouble for Penn State Officials, CNN (July 2, 2012, 10:05 PM), http:// 
www.cnn.com/2012/06/30/justice/penn-state-emails/index.html [https://perma.cc/VEW4-
GVWJ] (detailing actions taken by Penn State administration after gaining knowledge of 
alleged child sexual abuse committed by former football coach, Jerry Sandusky). 
16.  See, e.g., Ellen M. Bublick, Who is Responsible for Child Sexual Abuse? A View 
from the Penn State Scandal, 17 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 297, 310 (2014) (“[W]hen asking 
the civil responsibility question in a way that seeks to prevent child sexual abuse, courts should 
retain the accountability of third parties.”); cf. Rosemarie Ferrante, Note, The Discovery Rule: 
Allowing Adult Survivors of Childhood Sexual Abuse the Opportunity for Redress, 61 BROOK. 
L. REV. 199, 229–30 (1995) (arguing opportunity to prove sexual abuse occurred when harm 
caused by abuse caused repression and failure to bring suit within limitations period is issue of 
“fundamental fairness”).   
17.  See Jenna Miller, Note, The Constitutionality of and Need for Retroactive Civil 
Legislation Relating to Child Sexual Abuse, 17 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 599, 603 (2011) 
(discussing the tendency of child abuse victims to keep stories of their abuse to themselves). 
18.  See DOBBS, supra note 13, § 247 (noting child sexual abuse claims are “typically 
brought by mature adults, thirty or forty years of age or even older”); see also Miller, supra 
note 17, at 603 (discussing the story of a California police officer who was extremely hesitant 
to come forward with his personal experience of being sexually abused by a priest as child due 
to shame and embarrassment). 
19.  See DOBBS, supra note 13, § 247 (discussing the effects of repressed memory and 
other psychological impediments to bringing suit against perpetrators of child sexual abuse).  In 
many child sexual abuse cases, “the claim is that the plaintiff’s suffering leads to repression . . . 
that causes her to lose all conscious memory of the abuse before she has become an adult.”  See 
id.; see also Miller, supra note 17, at 605 (discussing the effect of statute of limitations on child 
sexual abuse victims who were not psychologically ready to file lawsuit against their abuser as 
children). 
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CSA suit.20 
This Comment analyzes how state constitutions and statutes of limitations 
prevent institutions from being held accountable for CSA.21  Specifically, this 
Comment draws attention to institutional CSA in America—a pressing issue that 
lawmakers and average citizens may not consider when contemplating the issue 
of retroactive statutes of limitations.22  This Comment contends that all states 
should adopt a constitutional approach that permits retroactive extensions of 
statutes of limitations.23  This approach would grant state lawmakers the authority 
to retroactively apply extensions to the statute of limitations for civil CSA cases.24  
Reviving time-barred sexual abuse claims not only allows state legislatures to 
empower victims, but it would also hold institutions liable for abuses that they 
contributed to.25 
Part II of this Comment discusses statutes of limitation generally, the legal 
issues that arise from retroactive extensions of these laws, and the implications 
of limitation periods in civil institutional CSA cases.26  Part III provides a detailed 
summary of federal and state cases, statutes, and judicial reasoning supporting 
the three approaches to evaluating state constitutionality of retroactive statutes.27  
Part IV offers a critical analysis of the impact state constitutions and statutes of 
limitation have on CSA victims and potentially responsible institutions.28  Part V 
concludes the Comment and encourages constituents and lawmakers in states 
prohibiting retroactive extensions to consider how this type of public policy may 
contribute to or perpetuate the problem of CSA within organizations.29 
 
20.  See Doe v. Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 119 A.3d 462, 510 (Conn. 
2015) (discussing the impact of state constitutional restrictions on the ability of state legislatures 
to revive a time-barred claim through the retroactive extension of statutes of limitations). 
21.  See id. at 508–14 (discussing the approaches employed by all forty-four U.S. “sister” 
states, which have decided the issue of retroactive revival of time-barred claims as of 2015). 
22.  For a discussion of civil claims for child sexual abuse against supervising institutions, 
see infra note 51–57 and accompanying text. 
23.  For a discussion of why all states should adopt retroactive statutes of limitations, see 
infra notes 145–61 and accompanying text.  See Campbell v. Holt, 115 U.S. 620, 629 (1885) 
(establishing federal approach to evaluating constitutionality of revival of previously 
time-barred claims through retroactive extension of statutes of limitation); see also Chase Sec. 
Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314 (1945) (confirming approach established in Campbell 
in modern day securities litigation context). 
24.  See Hartford Roman Catholic, 119 A.3d at 509 (discussing impact of Campbell and 
Chase Securities on legislative authority).  
25.  See Bublick, supra note 16, at 302–07 (discussing importance of preserving 
institutional accountability in child sexual abuse cases). 
26.  For a further discussion of retroactively extended statutes of limitation as applied to 
civil institutional child sexual abuse claims, see infra notes 40–50 and accompanying text. 
27.  For a further discussion of the cases, statutes, and constitutional provisions that make 
up each approach to retroactivity and the statute of limitations, see infra notes 75–144 and 
accompanying text. 
 28.  For a critical analysis of the various approaches used by states in determining state 
constitutionality of retroactive extensions of statutes of limitations, see infra notes 145–61 and 
accompanying text. 
29.  For a discussion of the impact of the various approaches used by states, see infra 
notes 162–72 and accompanying text. 
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II.  BACKGROUND: CAN TIME REALLY HEAL ALL WOUNDS? 
Simply put, a CSA victim may be prevented from holding responsible parties 
accountable because their actions may not have been filed within the state’s 
statute of limitations period.30  However, in an attempt to allow alleged victims 
to have their day in court, some state legislatures have amended their laws so that 
the statute of limitations may be retroactively extended in several contexts, 
including CSA.31  This type of retroactive legislation revives expired civil CSA 
claims that were not timely filed within the statute of limitations, giving victims 
another opportunity to file a legal action.32 
A. Beat the Clock: The Statute of Limitations 
Generally, the term statute of limitations refers to a “time frame set by 
legislation where affected parties need to take action to enforce rights or seek 
 
30.  See Miller, supra note 17, at 600 (explaining the application of statutes of limitation 
to child sexual abuse claims). 
31.  See, e.g., Doe v. Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 119 A.3d 462, 509 (Conn. 
2015) (discussing legislative approaches to reviving time-barred claims by retroactively 
extending the statute of limitations period in some causes of action).  In Hartford Roman 
Catholic, the Supreme Court of Connecticut evaluated the validity of an extension of the sexual 
abuse statute of limitations, which retroactively revived a plaintiff’s otherwise time-barred 
claim under the Connecticut constitution.  See id. at 494–95 (identifying a defendant’s state 
constitutional challenge to the extension of statute of limitations in Connecticut).  The plaintiff, 
who brought the civil action, had been sexually abused as a child by a Roman Catholic priest 
supervised by the defendant, the Archdiocese of Hartford, a Roman Catholic Diocese.  See id. 
at 470.  At the trial level, a jury found the Archdiocese had proximately caused the plaintiff’s 
injuries through negligent and reckless conduct, specifically in its (1) supervision of the abusive 
priest, (2) failure to eject the priest once it became aware of the abuse, and (3) failure to warn 
others of the threat that the priest presented to others.  See id. at 476 (summarizing the trial 
court’s findings and judgment against the defendant).  However, on appeal, the diocese argued 
that the statute of limitations for sexual abuse in Connecticut had time-barred the plaintiff’s 
cause of action and that the retroactive application of the statute violated the diocese’s 
substantive due process rights under the Connecticut constitution.  See id.  The Archdiocese 
argued that, as a matter of substantive due process, the Connecticut state constitution, unlike 
the United States Constitution, prohibits the type of retroactive extension of the statute of 
limitations.  See id. at 495.  Connecticut courts use six factors when evaluating the validity of 
this type of legislation under the Connecticut constitution.  See id. at 497 (explaining that 
Geisler established the framework to determine if the Connecticut constitution affords greater 
protection than the United States Constitution).  Because one of these factors requires weighing 
the persuasive precedents of other state courts, the Supreme Court of Connecticut in Hartford 
Roman Catholic engaged in a comprehensive survey of the approaches used by all those states 
that have made state constitutional rulings on retroactive extensions of statutes of limitations as 
a general matter.  See Hartford Roman Catholic, 119 A.3d at 508–09 (discussing the method of 
determining various state approaches).  In its rigorous analysis, the Supreme Court of 
Connecticut grouped together states that have ruled on this issue into three large categories and 
specifically referenced the leading case that supports the approach currently used by each state.  
See id. at 509–13.  The Supreme Court of Connecticut specifically categorized the state 
approaches into three groups: (1) those that follow the federal approach in Campbell and Chase 
Securities, (2) those that hold that amending a statute of limitations to revive a time-lapsed claim 
is per se invalid, and (3) those that fall between the other two broad approaches.  See id.  
32.  See Miller, supra note 18, at 600 (discussing the concept of revival of otherwise 
time-barred claims through retroactive extensions of statutes of limitations as applied 
specifically to civil child sexual abuse claims). 
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redress after injury or damage.”33  After this time period has expired, rights, such 
as the ability to recover civil damages, can no longer be enforced by a legal action 
or lawsuit.34  These types of statutes exist primarily to provide fairness to 
defendants.35  At some point, a cause of action becomes so “ancient” that a party 
cannot reasonably expect to be obligated to legally answer for its past actions.36 
There are a variety of valid reasons why these ancient causes of action are 
not fit to be brought before a court and are time-barred by legislators.37  Over 
time, evidence may not be properly preserved and witnesses, if they can even be 
found, may have forgotten essential facts.38  The statute of limitations reflects a 
public policy that it is unfair to assign blame to a party based on evidence that 
has been significantly devalued over time.39 
B. Tick Tock: Child Sexual Abuse, Statute of Limitations, and 
Retroactivity 
In the civil context, a law is “retroactive” if it applies to conduct even if it 
was enacted after that conduct occurred.40  A retroactive law can take precedent 
 
33.  See Statute of Limitations, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (2d online ed. 2018) 
(defining the term “statute of limitations”). 
34.  See Miller, supra note 17, at 600 (identifying the consequences associated with 
expiration of statutes of limitations).  The lapse of the statute of limitations period essentially 
ends the game for a potential plaintiff as would the game clock in an athletic event after it hits 
zero and signals that the contest is over.  See id. 
35.  See Developments in the Law Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1177, 1185 
(1950) (explaining the primary goal of statutes of limitations).  Federal courts have also 
recognized the importance of statutes of limitations in providing fairness to defendants. See id. 
at 1185.  For a discussion of the statute of limitations as applied by the Supreme Court, see infra 
notes 79–112. 
36.  See Developments in the Law Statutes of Limitations, supra note 35, at 1185 
(discussing a defendant’s reasonable expectation not to answer to legal obligations after a 
prolonged time period); see also The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 476 (1897) (“The 
foundation of the acquisition of rights by lapse of time is to be looked for in the position of the 
person who gains them, not in that of the loser.”). 
37.  See, e.g., Order of R.R. Tels. v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 349 (1994) 
(identifying reasons supporting statute of limitations legislation); see also James R. MacAyeal, 
The Discovery Rule and The Continuing Violation Doctrine as Exceptions to the Statute of 
Limitations for Civil Environmental Penalty Claims, 15 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 589, 590–92 (1996) 
(identifying four purposes of statutes of limitations as (1) encouraging prompt filing of claims, 
(2) protecting defendants from fraudulent claims, (3) providing defendant with assurance that 
liability will not be attached for conduct from long ago, and (4) promoting efficient judicial 
administration). 
38.  See Order of R.R. Tels., 321 U.S. at 349 (explaining the purposes served by statutes 
of limitations).  In discussing the theory in favor of the statute of limitations even when a 
genuine and justified claim may exist, the Order of Railroad Telegraphers court noted “it is 
unjust not to put the adversary on notice to defend within the period of limitation and that the 
right to be free of stale claims in time comes to prevail over the right to prosecute them.”  See 
id. at 349; see also MacAyeal, supra note 37, at 590–92 (discussing fundamental purposes of 
statutes of limitation in promoting public policy and judicial administration). 
39.  See Developments in the Law Statutes of Limitations, supra note 35, at 1185–86 
(discussing public policy considerations supporting statutes of limitations, including outdated 
evidence and effectiveness of courts). 
40.  See Miller, supra note 17, at 600; see also Retroactive Statute, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (2d online ed. 2018) (“[A retroactive statute is] a law that imposes a new 
6
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over another law that may have previously applied to the conduct.41  For instance, 
consider Defendant A wronged Plaintiff A in 2010, and the 2010 statute of 
limitations for Plaintiff A’s cause of action was four years.42  Plaintiff A did not 
file suit by the time the statutory period ran out in 2014.43  However, in 2015, the 
legislature amended the law to a six-year statute of limitations, to be applied 
retroactively.44  This would mean that, although Plaintiff A missed the statute of 
limitations under the 2010 law, a suit could be filed under the new 2015 law.45 
While reviving a valid time-barred claim may seem appealing, the process 
of enacting retroactive extensions can raise many legal questions.46  Even in the 
noble context of addressing CSA, retroactive legislation in some states might 
infringe on a defendant’s vested constitutional right.47  In theory defendants 
acquire a vested right to be free from answering certain legal obligations when 
the defined time period for bringing a suit has lapsed under the statute of 
limitations.48  Retroactive extensions of the statute of limitations effectively strip 
defendants of such protections under the same statutory authority providing 
shelter from time-barred suits in the first place.49  For defendants who rely on the 
 
obligation on past things or a law that starts from a date in the past.”). 
41.  See Jan G. Laitos, Legislative Retroactivity, 52 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 
81, 82 (1997) (discussing creation of new legal obligations by way of retroactive legislation that 
did not exist under a previous legislative scheme). 
42.  Cf. id. at 87 (identifying impact of retroactive legislation and stating “[a]ction that 
was legally permissible at the time it occurred, is either made impermissible, or is burdened, in 
the past (i.e., prior to the applicable date of the new law)”). 
43.  Cf. id. 
44.  Cf. id. 
45.  Cf. id. 
46.  See id. at 82 (discussing the legal ramifications of retroactive legislation in general 
and proposing a temporal classification scheme for this type of legislation).  Retroactive 
legislation inherently involves legal relationships or decisions that relied on prior law that has 
since changed or been amended.  See id. (discussing a party’s reliance on a previously enacted 
law).  Because of the reliance on the previous state of a given law, retroactive legislation may 
affect pre-existing legal arrangements, impact rights of parties that have been previously 
established, and impose unanticipated consequences.  See id. (identifying specific areas that 
may be affected by retroactive legislation). 
47.  See Doe v. Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 119 A.3d 462, 510–11 (Conn. 
2015) (noting states where retroactive statutes of limitations are a violation of a defendant’s 
vested rights); 2 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK,  TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW § 15.9(a)(v) (2017) (discussing the importance of classification as a remedy or right for 
Fourteenth Amendment due process analysis); Campbell v. Holt—A Rule or an Exception?, 35 
YALE L.J. 478, 480 (1926) (discussing the impact of the Campbell decision on modern 
jurisprudence).  But see Miller, supra note 17, at 600 (discussing argument claiming that statute 
of limitations time lapse is vested right that a party is entitled to).  For a detailed discussion and 
analysis of the various state approaches to evaluating retroactive statutes of limitations, see infra 
notes 113–44 and accompanying text. 
48.  See Hartford Roman Catholic, 119 A.3d at 511 (noting states where defendant has a 
vested right in time-barred causes of action); see also Miller, supra note 17, at 600 (noting that, 
in some instances, retroactive legislation may infringe on a vested right that arose under 
previously enacted law).  When legislatures prohibit retroactive statutes of limitations because 
this action would infringe on vested rights, the retroactive legislation is considered invalid per 
se.  See Per Se, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (2d online ed. 2018) (defining term “per se” as “in 
itself; taken alone; inherently; in isolation; unconnected with other matters”). 
49.  See Miller, supra note 17, at 601 (“[A]busers would be deprived of reliance on the 
statute of limitations to protect them from liability.”); see also Laitos, supra note 41, at 91 
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protections of statutes of limitations, retroactive legislation can create a new 
burdensome obligation, impose a new duty, or attach new liability to events or 
considerations that have already taken place.50 
C. Institutional Accountability: You Do the Crime, You Do the Time 
CSA victims can sue both the perpetrator who physically committed the 
abuse and, under certain circumstances, the institution that supervised the 
abuser.51  Depending on the forum state or jurisdiction, potential tort claims that 
may be brought against churches and other negligent institutions include, but are 
not limited to, breach of fiduciary duty, negligent supervision, negligent 
retention, fraud, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.52  Such suits not 
only empower the victim, but can also have a deterrent effect on the institution’s 
enabling behavior.53 
The possibility of being held liable in a court of law encourages institutions 
to take measures to ensure that they protect the youth they are responsible for.54  
 
(identifying valid and invalid types of retroactive legislation).  The classic example of 
retroactivity is when a legislature adopts a rule that changes the legal implications on a party 
and implications that were already established under prior valid legislation.  See id.  The typical 
timeline for such an event can be summarized into four stages: 
 
(1) The legislative body adopts a substantive rule (the “old law”). 
(2) After its adoption, private conduct occurs consistent with, or perhaps because of, 
this old law. 
(3) The legislative body adopts a new substantive rule (the “new law”). 
(4) After its adoption, the new law in some way affects the legal consequences of the 
private conduct that occurred under the old law. 
 
Id. at 92. 
50.  See, e.g., Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 269 n.24 (1994) (providing 
examples of burdens of retroactive legislation, such as a new zoning law changing the 
expectations of a developer or an anti-gambling law passed after plans for a casino were 
approved); see also Miller, supra note 17, at 600 (discussing the Landgraf approach to 
retroactivity). 
51.  See, e.g., Doe v. Diocese of Dallas, 917 N.E.2d 475, 479 (Ill. 2009) (identifying civil 
claims brought against a diocese who supervised sexually abusive priest); see also 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.04 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2006) (defining and 
discussing theory of respondeat superior); Weinhold, supra note 9, at 534–37 (comparing direct 
liability against individual perpetrators of sexual abuse and vicarious liability against agencies 
responsible for abusers through respondeat superior).  “Respondeat superior is the specific 
theory of vicarious liability under which an employer is held responsible for the legal 
consequences of an employee’s intentional tort against a third party.”  Id. at 536. 
52.  See, e.g., Diocese of Dallas, 917 N.E. 2d at 475 (identifying tort claims brought 
against the Diocese of Dallas, including negligent supervision and negligent retention). 
53.  See Bublick, supra note 16, at 307 (arguing that imposing gatekeeper type liability 
on institutions serves a deterrent function).  This deterrent effect, specifically with respect to 
putting the public on notice of wrongdoing, has been used to deter individual sex offenders.  
See, e.g., Molly J. Walker Wilson, The Expansion of Criminal Registries and the Illusion of 
Control, 73 LA. L. REV. 509, 518 (2013) (discussing the legislative intent of sexual abuse laws 
as deterrence to potential offenders and discouragement of previous offenders from repeating 
illegal actions). 
54.  See Bublick, supra note 16, at 297–98, 307 (discussing the role courts and 
legislatures play in deterring child abuse); see also Frank A. Sloan et. al, Liability, Risk 
Perceptions, and Precautions at Bars, 43 J.L. & ECON. 473, 497–98 (2000) (noting tort liability 
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This argument is supported by the fact that institutions like the Catholic Church 
place significant value on maintaining a positive institutional image and 
reputation.55  Before the Boston Globe story was published in 2002, the media 
commonly cooperated in keeping CSA stories involving the church off the front 
page for the very reason of preserving its reputation, while institutional leaders 
went to great lengths to maintain a “pristine” image.56  Retroactively expanding 
CSA statutes of limitations may not generate new media coverage of the issue, 
but it may deter and prevent further institutional CSA.57 
III. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF RETROACTIVE EXTENSIONS OF STATUTES OF 
LIMITATIONS 
The federal constitutional concerns associated with retroactive extensions of 
statutes of limitations are rooted in the Fourteenth Amendment.58  The Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the states from taking 
life, liberty, or property of its citizens without due process of law.59  The 
Fourteenth Amendment is relevant in the context of statutes of limitations 
because the Due Process Clause protects the vested property rights of a defendant, 
which, some have argued, includes the right to rely on the expired limitations 
 
as a deterrent has not been researched thoroughly but arguing “theoretical analyses of tort as a 
deterrent are quite optimistic about its effects”). 
55.  See Hamilton, supra note 10, at 424 (discussing taboos associated with talking about 
the Catholic Church and child sexual abuse). 
56.  See id. (discussing the role of the media in preserving institutional reputation through 
the lack of adequate coverage of institutional child sexual abuse). 
57.  See id. at 439 (“Now, with the public becoming more well-informed and the horrible 
facts [of child sex abuse] on the front pages, there is a real possibility that the legal system can 
be reformed to protect children and deter institutions that protect abusers.” (emphasis added)); 
see also Patrick M. Garry, The Rising Role of State Constitutional Law: An Introduction to a 
Series of Articles on the South Dakota Constitution, 59 S.D. L. REV. 4, 7 (2014) (discussing 
how state constitutions “set up the basic organization of government, outline various 
government duties, and specify and protect individual rights”). 
58.  See Campbell v. Holt, 115 U.S. 620, 628–29 (1885) (holding the revival of debt claim 
previously time-barred by statute of limitations is constitutionally permissible under the 
Fourteenth Amendment).  Although the holding in Campbell may seem dated, the Court again 
visited the issue of reviving time-barred claims in Chase Securities.  See Chase Sec. Corp. v. 
Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 315 (1945) (“The Fourteenth Amendment does not make an act of 
state legislation void merely because it has some retrospective operation.”).  Despite the time 
that had lapsed between these two decisions, the Court still grounded its holding in its 
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment.  See id. at 315–16 (“[I]t cannot be said that lifting 
the bar of a statute of limitation so as to restore a remedy lost through mere lapse of time is per 
se an offense against the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
59.  See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (establishing constitutional due process rights for 
American citizens).  Section one of the Fourteenth Amendment provides: 
 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.  No 
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities 
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction 
the equal protection of the laws. 
 
Id. (emphasis added). 
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period to dismiss a civil suit.60 
However, the scope of Fourteenth Amendment’s due process protection, as 
defined by the courts, has long excluded lapsed statute of limitations periods.61  
This lapse of time is merely considered a remedy for a defendant, as opposed to 
a property right.62  As a result, enacting legislation that revives a claim otherwise 
time-barred by the statute of limitations does not offend a defendant’s Fourteenth 
Amendment due process rights and is therefore permissible under the federal 
constitution.63 
Despite the constitutionality of retroactive extensions of statutes of 
limitations at the federal level, states are currently divided on whether these 
extensions violate their state constitutions.64  Although some states embrace the 
federal approach, others substantially deviate from that type of constitutional 
interpretation.65 
There are currently three approaches states use to evaluate the 
constitutionality of this issue: (1) the federal approach, (2) the per se invalid 
approach, and (3) the mixed approach, which falls between the other two 
dichotomized positions.66  The common effect each approach has on retroactive 
extensions of the statute of limitations is significant.67  States following the 
federal approach allow retroactive extensions under their state constitution.68  
 
60.  See, e.g., Doe v. Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 119 A.3d 462, 511 (Conn. 
2015) (noting states where defendant has a vested right in time-barred causes of action); Ryan 
C. Williams, The One and Only Substantive Due Process Clause, 120 YALE L.J. 408, 423 
(2010) (explaining that vested rights is a natural law concept that endows persons with certain 
inalienable rights that a legislature cannot rescind). 
61.  For a discussion of the Campbell and Chase Securities decisions and impact of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, see infra notes 79–112 and accompanying text.  
62.  See Campbell, 115 U.S. at 628–29 (distinguishing between vested property rights 
protected by Fourteenth Amendment and remedies that fall outside the scope of protections). 
63.  See id. (holding that defendants hold no property right in statutes of limitations and, 
as a result, retroactive legislation does not infringe on any Fourteenth Amendment rights). 
64.  See Hartford Roman Catholic, 119 A.3d at 508–13 (discussing varying state views 
in assessing the constitutionality of reviving claims previously time-barred by the statute of 
limitations). 
65.  See id. (discussing the state approaches that deviate from federal approach outlined 
in Campbell and Chase Securities). 
66.  See id. (noting the three state approaches to the constitutionality of retroactive 
statutes of limitations).  For a further discussion about the three categories of approaches to state 
constitutionality of retroactive extensions to statutes of limitations generally, see supra note 31 
and accompanying text. 
67.  For a discussion of the effect that these differing state approaches have, see infra 
note 75–144 and accompanying text. 
68.  See Hartford Roman Catholic, 119 A.3d at 509 (identifying “sister states” that adopt 
the federal constitutional approach of applying retroactive extensions of statutes of limitations 
generally).  Eighteen states follow the federal approach as established in Campbell and Chase 
Securities.  See id.  Those states include Arizona, California, Delaware, Georgia, Hawai‘i, 
Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, New Jersey, New 
Mexico, North Dakota, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming.  See id.  Generally, the 
federal approach used by these states allows “the retroactive expansion of the statute of 
limitations to revive otherwise time-lapsed claims—seemingly without limitation.”  See id.  
Although the Supreme Court of Connecticut identified eighteen states that use the federal 
approach, after the ruling in Hartford Roman Catholic, it is clear that Connecticut also evaluates 
a defendant’s substantive due process rights, which is consistent with Campbell and Chase 
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Conversely, states that use the per se invalid method prohibit this type of statute.69  
Avoiding a sweeping “yes” or “no” answer to this question, the remaining states 
that use the mixed approach evaluate the state constitutionality within the specific 
context that the legislation was passed.70  The approach that states adopt depends 
on whether the state constitution considers the lapse of a limitations period a 
vested substantive right or a mere remedy.71 
Whether a retroactive state statute of limitations is constitutional under a 
state’s constitution depends on how much weight a defendant’s interest carries in 
seeing the statute of limitations lapse.72  States that apply the per se invalid 
approach and preclude retroactive extensions absolve alleged institutional 
defendants, such as the Catholic Church, Penn State, or the Boy Scouts of 
America, from civil liability after the statute of limitations has run.73  In these 
situations, state constitutions shield institutions that had a hand in devastating 
many young lives.74 
IV. APPROACHES TO STATE CONSTITUTIONALITY: CAN WE RESET THE CLOCK? 
Prior to 2015, courts in forty-four states ruled on whether retroactive 
extensions of a statute of limitations that revive a time-barred action violated 
substantive due process rights under a state constitution.75  However, 
Connecticut’s 2015 decision in Doe v. Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan 
Corp.76 raised this total to forty-five states.77  There is much variation among 
 
Securities.  See id. at 517–18 (holding “retroactive application . . . which revived the plaintiff’s 
otherwise time barred claims, did not violate the defendant’s substantive due process rights 
under the Connecticut constitution”). 
69.  See id. at 510–11 (identifying states that absolutely bar revival of time-barred 
claims).  Twenty-four states use the per se invalid approach for a variety of reasons.  See id.  
Those states include Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, 
Kentucky, Maine, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, 
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, 
and Virginia.  See id. at 510–11 (identifying states that hold the revival of time-barred claims 
through retroactive statutes of limitations as per se invalid). 
70.  See id. at 512–13 (discussing approaches used by New York and Wisconsin when 
assessing constitutionality of retroactive extensions to statutes of limitation generally). 
71.  See id. at 509–12 (illustrating state constitutional due process approaches to statutes 
of limitations can be divided into three groups: federal approach, per se invalid approach, and 
the mixed approach). 
72.  See, e.g., Kelly v. Marcantonio, 678 A.2d 873, 883 (R.I. 1996) (stating “state 
appellate courts, however, are free to interpret and to construe their own state constitutional due 
process and equal protection provisions”). 
73.  See Hartford Roman Catholic, 119 A.3d at 511–13 (discussing the legal impact of 
barring revival of time-lapsed claims under state constitutions). 
74.  See Miller, supra note 17, at 617 (arguing constitutional authority to enact retroactive 
child sexual abuse laws would allow “more child sexual abuse victims . . . to obtain the benefits 
these laws provide”). 
75.  See Hartford Roman Catholic, 119 A.3d at 508 (noting that forty-four states have 
previously ruled on the issue of whether the revival of already time-barred claims violates 
substantive due process).  For a detailed discussion of state precedent discussing these holdings 
and reasoning, see infra notes 113–44 and accompanying text. 
76.  119 A.3d 462 (Conn. 2015). 
77.  See Hartford Roman Catholic, 119 A.3d at 517–18 (holding that the legislature’s 
enactment of retroactive legislation reviving sexual abuse claims passed rational basis review 
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these holdings, and even the states that reach the same general conclusion about 
statutes of limitation cite a diverse array of authority to support the holding in 
each state’s leading case.78 
A. The Federal Approach Under Campbell and Chase Securities: All We Got 
Is Time 
The decisions in Campbell v. Holt79 and Chase Securities Corp. v. 
Donaldson80 signify that retroactive extensions of the statute of limitations are 
permissible under the United States Constitution “seemingly without 
limitation.”81  Notably, Campbell establishes the threshold determination of 
whether the statute in question affects a remedy or a right.82  Although these two 
seminal cases were not decided in the context of CSA, the rule established by 
Campbell and later confirmed by Chase Securities, has significant implications 
on statutes of limitations as a general proposition.83  When considering retroactive 
extensions of statutes of limitations under the United States Constitution in any 
context, Campbell establishes that these types of statutes “go to matters of 
remedy, [and] not to destruction of fundamental rights.”84 
1. Campbell v. Holt: Please Reset the Game Clock 
In 1885, the Supreme Court established the long-standing rule that statutes 
reviving causes of action previously barred by a statute of limitations only 
extinguish the remedy associated with the claim, not a vested right.85  In 
Campbell, the plaintiff, Malvina Stamps, sued to recover a cash debt owed to 
her.86  Although her original cause of action would have expired in 1859, the 
Texas legislature, in response to the Civil War, suspended all statutes of 
limitations.87  In 1866, the legislature passed a law that commenced all statutes 
of limitation.88  Thus, Stamps had until 1868 to file suit against the defendants.89  
 
and did not violate diocese’s substantive due process rights). 
78.  See id. at 509–13 (discussing the constitutional or statutory authority, or lack thereof, 
relied on by forty-four states that have ruled on the revival of claims previously time-barred by 
the statute of limitations). 
79.  115 U.S. 620 (1885). 
80.  325 U.S. 304 (1945). 
81.  See Hartford Roman Catholic, 119 A.3d at 509 (emphasis added).  
82.  See ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 47, § 15.9(a)(v) (discussing the importance of 
classifying whether the statute affects a remedy or right for Fourteenth Amendment due process 
analysis). 
83.  See id. (discussing the holding of Chase Securities and remedies under statutes of 
limitations). 
84.  See Chase Sec. Corp., 325 U.S. at 314 (emphasis added). 
85.  See Campbell v. Holt, 115 U.S. 620, 628–29 (1885) (holding lapse of statute of 
limitations period provides party with remedy and not substantive right under the United States 
Constitution). 
86.  See id. at 620 (describing the facts of the case). 
87.  See id. at 621. 
88.  See id. 
89.  See id. (noting that in 1866, “the statute . . . began to run against her in this case, and 
would become a bar in two years”). 
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However, she failed to file suit within that time frame, and her claim was barred.90 
In 1869, however, the Texas legislature revised the state’s constitution, 
which contained a new provision stating that all prior suspensions were still in 
effect until the new constitution was ratified.91  This announcement essentially 
nullified the 1866 legislation commencing the two-year statute of limitations, and 
the statutes of limitations for Stamps’s cause of action remained suspended.92  
Stamps then timely filed suit in 1874, within the two years since the Texas 
legislature officially adopted the new constitution.93 
The defendants, in an attempt to get out of their debt payment, argued that 
this state constitutional provision was void because it deprived them of a vested 
property right protected by the United States Constitution in the form of the 
time-bar created by the statute of limitations.94  Holding that the plaintiff was 
entitled to recover the debt, the Court reasoned that providing a new remedy after 
the time-bar had taken effect under the statute did not create a new right for a 
plaintiff or impose a new duty to defend on the defendant.95  Moreover, because 
the Fourteenth Amendment only protects substantive rights and not remedies, the 
statute of limitations period falls outside the scope of due process protections.96  
As a result, the revival of a time-barred claim is constitutionally permissible at 
the federal level.97 
By distinguishing between substantive and remedial statutes, the Campbell 
Court clarified that substantive rights are protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment, while remedies are not.98  As a mere remedy, a defendant has no 
vested property right to a statute of limitations defense.99  Remedies are not 
“immune from legislative controls” under the Constitution, and “no one 
reasonably can expect” them to be.100  Therefore, legislative revival of a claim 
 
90.  See id. 
91.  See id. (the provision stated, “[t]he statutes of limitations of civil suits were 
suspended by the so-called act of secession . . . and shall be considered as suspended within this 
state until the acceptance of this constitution by the United States congress” (internal quotations 
omitted)). 
92.  See id.  
93.  See id. at 620.  
94.  See id. at 622 (discussing the lapse of limitations period as a defense to recovery of 
the debt lawsuit). 
95.  See id. at 628 (“The authorities we have cited, especially in this court, show that no 
right is destroyed when the law restores a remedy which had been lost.”). 
96.  See id. at 628–29 (distinguishing between remedies and substantive rights and 
clarifying that only substantive rights enjoy due process protections promised by the Fourteenth 
Amendment); see also Campbell v. Holt—A Rule or an Exception?, supra note 47, at 480 
(discussing the impact of Campbell on modern jurisprudence). 
97.  See Campbell, 115 U.S. at 628 (“It violates no right of [the defendant’s] . . . when 
the legislature says time shall be no bar, though such was the law when the contract was made.”). 
98.  See Campbell v. Holt—A Rule or an Exception?, supra note 47, at 480 (discussing 
the difference between substantive and remedial rights and clarifying the Campbell decision 
provided as to this issue).  However, the distinction between classifications of right and remedy 
is not easily defined.  See ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 47, § 15.9(a)(v) (“The distinction 
between a right and a remedy, at times, can become hazy.”). 
99.  See Campbell v. Holt—A Rule or an Exception?, supra note 47, at 480–81 (noting if 
the statute of limitations only destroys the defendant’s remedy, the plaintiff’s right to sue 
remains intact). 
100.  See ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 47, § 15.9(a)(v). 
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that was time-barred by a previous statute is not a violation of the substantive due 
process rights provided by the Fourteenth Amendment.101 
2. Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson: Back to the Future 
Expanding past the context of debt, the Supreme Court in Chase Securities 
once again found that a retroactive amendment to a statute of limitations did not 
violate a defendant’s due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.102  In 
Chase Securities, a plaintiff brought a civil securities action against a defendant 
under the Minnesota Blue Sky Law.103  Agreeing with the defendant’s argument, 
the Minnesota Supreme Court found that the statute of limitations under the Blue 
Sky Law had run.104  However, during the time the plaintiff was appealing this 
decision, the Minnesota legislature lifted the statute of limitations bar for several 
categories of Blue Sky Law cases, including the type of claim brought against the 
defendant.105  After learning of this legislative change, the plaintiff re-asserted 
his original claim.106 
In response, the defendant raised a constitutional challenge to Minnesota’s 
retroactive amendment to the Blue Sky Law’s statute of limitations.107  Before 
the Supreme Court of the United States, the defendant claimed that the retroactive 
 
101.  See DOBBS, supra note 13, § 247 (discussing the federal constitutional implications 
of the Campbell Court’s holding that statutes of limitations create remedies that fall outside the 
scope of Fourteenth Amendment protections).  With respect to amended statutes of limitations 
that revive otherwise time lapsed claims, “federal case law supports the constitutionality of such 
an application as a general matter of federal due process.”  See id.  
102.  See Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314–16 (1945) (noting Court’s 
agreement with Campbell).  
103.  See id. at 305–06 (identifying the plaintiff’s cause of action).  This suit was brought 
under Minnesota’s Blue Sky Law—the state’s securities law—in the context of a securities 
litigation that alleged failure to register business units, illegal sales, as well as common-law 
fraud and deceit.  See id. at 306. 
104.  See id. at 308–09 (discussing the procedural history of the case); see also ROTUNDA 
& NOWAK, supra note 47, § 15.9(a)(v) (summarizing the Chase Securities case). 
105.  See Chase Sec., 325 U.S. at 307–08 (identifying the timeline of the plaintiff’s 
allegations and Minnesota’s amendment to the statute of limitations for specific securities 
litigation claims).  The previous statute of limitations in Minnesota for fraud did not begin 
running until the fraud was discovered.  See id. at 307 (identifying the state of the previous law 
in Minnesota).  However, the new statute of limitations had the following implications on the 
parties in Chase Securities: 
 
Under the new law, actions for failure to disclose non-registration or for 
misrepresentations concerning registration . . . must be brought within six years of 
delivery of the securities.  Aggrieved purchasers were therefore denied future benefit 
of suspension of the period of limitation during the time such frauds or grounds of 
action remained undiscovered . . . .  The effect of this was to abolish any defense that 
appellant might otherwise have made under the Minnesota statutes of limitation. 
 
Id. at 307–08. (emphasis added). 
106.  See id. at 308 (discussing the procedural history of the plaintiff’s securities claim); 
see also ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 47, § 15.9(a)(v) (discussing the facts of Chase 
Securities). 
107.  See Chase Sec. Corp., 325 U.S. at 308 (describing defendant’s constitutional 
challenge to the retroactive statute of limitations). 
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legislation was a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment due process right to 
invoke the statute of limitations as a defense.108  Disagreeing with the defendant’s 
position, the Court held that retroactively extending the statute of limitations for 
the Minnesota Blue Sky Law was permissible under the United States 
Constitution and consistent with the Court’s holding in Campbell.109  Echoing its 
decision in Campbell, the Court reasoned that the statute of limitations merely 
created a remedy for a defendant, not a right, and therefore the statutory bar to 
suit fell outside the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment due process 
protections.110  By holding that there is no fundamental right to raising the defense 
of the statute of limitations, the Court noted that the federal constitution does not 
immunize the defendant from suit just because the legislature’s policy change is 
disadvantageous.111  The Court noted that, because “[t]he statute of limitations 
was a legislative creation . . . the legislature could remove the statute to allow 
plaintiffs to pursue their remedy.”112 
3. Keep an Eye on the Clock: The Federal Approach Among the States 
Currently, eighteen states stand with the federal government’s approach to 
the constitutional interpretation of retroactive extensions of the statute of 
limitations.113  Fourteen of these states view the defense of the statute of 
limitations through the lens of their state constitutions.114  These states have 
interpreted their respective state constitutions to grant no vested right to a statute 
of limitations defense.115  In this situation, a party’s substantive due process rights 
 
108.  See id. at 305 (discussing the defendant’s constitutional challenge to the Minnesota 
legislature retroactively reviving the securities claim after the limitations period had expired). 
109.  See id. at 315 (“The essential holding in Campbell v. Holt, so far as it applies to this 
case, is sound and should not be overruled.  The Fourteenth Amendment does not make an act 
of state legislation void merely because it has some retrospective operation.”).   
110.  See id. (discussing the Campbell holding).  Relying on Campbell, the Court noted: 
 
The Fourteenth Amendment does not make an act of state legislation void merely 
because it has some retrospective operation.  What it does forbid is taking of life, 
liberty or property without due process of law . . . .  Assuming that statutes of 
limitation like other types of legislation could be so manipulated that their retroactive 
effects would offend the Constitution, certainly it cannot be said that lifting the bar 
of a statute of limitation so as to restore a remedy lost through mere lapse of time is 
per se an offense against the Fourteenth Amendment. 
 
Id. at 315–16. 
111.  See id. at 316 (“Whatever grievance appellant may have at the change of policy to 
its disadvantage, it had acquired no immunity from this suit that has become a federal 
constitutional right.”).  
112.  See ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 47, § 15.9(a)(v). 
113.  See Doe v. Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 119 A.3d 462, 509 (Conn. 
2015) (surveying state approaches to evaluating the state constitutionality of the retroactive 
expansion of statutes of limitations). 
114.  See id. at 509 (identifying fourteen states that grounded their approaches on the 
issue of statutes of limitations time lapses in the interpretation of state constitutions). 
115.  See id. (“[F]ourteen states, namely Arizona, California, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, 
Kansas, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, New Jersey, North Dakota, 
Washington, and Wyoming, hold that the retroactive expansion of the statute of limitations to 
revive time barred claims is not a violations of a defendant’s substantive due process 
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cannot be violated and therefore retroactive extensions of the statute of 
limitations are constitutionally permissible.116 
However, nuances are still evident—even in states that employ a Campbell 
approach rooted in state constitutional interpretation.117  For example, Georgia’s 
is the only state constitution that contains a provision that explicitly prohibits 
retroactive legislation.118  Despite this constitutional conflict, the Supreme Court 
 
rights . . . .”). 
116.  See id. (discussing the constitutional rationale for permitting legislation that revives 
otherwise time-barred claims in fourteen states).  States that have permitted retroactive statutes 
of limitations include, but are not limited to, Arizona, California, Delaware, Hawai’i, Idaho, 
Kansas, Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana, New Jersey, North Dakota, Washington, and 
Wyoming.  See, e.g., Chevron Chem. Co. v. Super. Ct., 641 P.2d 1275, 1284 (Ariz. 1982) 
(holding that “subsequent extensions” of the statute of limitations does not violate the 
constitution); 20th Century Ins. Co. v. Super. Ct., 90 Cal. App. 4th 1247, 1263 (2001) (noting 
the rule established in Campbell and Chase Securities is also the rule followed in California); 
Sheehan v. Oblates of St. Francis de Sales, 15 A.3d 1247, 1259 (Del. 2011) (“As a matter of 
constitutional law, statutes of limitation go to matters of remedy not destruction of fundamental 
rights . . . .  Accordingly, the General Assembly has the power to determine a statute of 
limitations and such a determination does not violate [the Delaware constitution due process 
clause] if it is reasonable.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Roe v. Doe, 581 
P.2d 310, 315 (Haw. 1978) (“We are unable . . . to accept the proposition that statutory causes 
of action which become barred through the expiration of a statute of limitations can never be 
revived by a subsequent legislative extension of that period of limitations.”); Peterson v. 
Peterson, 320 P.3d 1244, 1250 (Idaho 2014) (“[S]tatutes of limitation involve matters of 
remedy, not destruction of rights.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Hecla Mining 
Co. v. Idaho State Tax Comm’n, 697 P.2d 1161, 1164 (Idaho 1985))); Harding v. K.C. Wall 
Prods., Inc., 831 P.2d 958, 968 (Kan. 1992) (“The legislature has the power to revive actions 
barred by a statute of limitations if it specifically expresses its intent to do so through retroactive 
application of a new law.”); City of Boston v. Keene Corp., 547 N.E.2d 328, 335 (Mass. 1989) 
(“[T]he running of the limitations period on such claims does not create a vested right which 
cannot constitutionally be taken away by subsequent statutory revival of the barred remedy.” 
(citation omitted)); Pryber v. Marriott Corp., 296 N.W.2d 597, 600 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980) (“The 
right to defeat a claim by the interposition of a statute of limitations is a right which may be 
removed by the Legislature.” (citations omitted)); Cosgriffe v. Cosgriffe, 864 P.2d 776, 779 
(Mont. 1993) (“Montana follows . . . [the Campbell approach] in regard to due process and the 
retroactive application of statutes of limitation.”); Panzino v. Cont’l Can Co., 364 A.2d 1043, 
1046 (N.J. 1976) (discussing the implications of the Campbell reasoning within New Jersey); 
In re W.M.V., 268 N.W.2d 781, 786 (N.D. 1978) (holding the revival of time-barred causes did 
not violate the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution or the North Dakota constitution); 
Lane v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 151 P.2d 440, 445 (Wash. 1944) (holding no vested right is 
affected in reviving a previously time-barred claim); Vigil v. Tafoya, 600 P.2d 721, 725 (Wyo. 
1979) (applying the test established in Chase Securities to evaluate retroactive extensions of 
statutes of limitations under the Wyoming Constitution).  
117.  See, e.g., Hartford Roman Catholic, 119 A.3d at 509 (summarizing the Georgia 
supreme court’s reasoning in a leading decision regarding extensions of statutes of limitations). 
118.  See id. at 509 (citing Canton Textile Mills, Inc. v. Lathem, 317 S.E.2d 189 (Ga. 
1984)) (discussing the Georgia supreme court’s holding regarding revival of time-barred 
claims).  The Georgia constitution expressly prohibits the enacting of retroactive laws.  See GA. 
CONST. art. I, § 1, ¶ X (“No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, retroactive law, or laws impairing 
the obligation of contract or making irrevocable grant of special privileges or immunities shall 
be passed.” (emphasis added)).  However, like the United States Supreme Court, the Georgia 
supreme court has held that the “statute of limitation[s] is remedial in nature.” See Jaro, Inc. v. 
Shields, 181 S.E.2d 110, 111 (Ga. 1971).  This remedial classification, despite the prohibition 
against retroactive laws, has led the Georgia supreme court to hold “although retroactive, 
[statutes of limitations] will be enforced, provided they do not impair the obligation of contracts 
or disturb absolutely vested rights, and only go to confirm rights already existing, and in 
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of Georgia held that the statute of limitations defense falls outside the scope of 
the retroactive legislation ban because of its classification as a remedy in 
Georgia.119  Conversely, three federal approach states—Iowa, West Virginia, and 
New Mexico—permit retroactive extensions but do not cite constitutional 
authority.120  Instead, these states rely on judicial canons of construction.121 
B. Tick Tock: The Impermissible Per Se Approach 
Departing from the federal approach, twenty-four states have held that a 
retroactive extension to a statute of limitations that revives an otherwise 
time-barred claim is per se impermissible, meaning that it is absolutely invalid in 
any context.122  Although a large mass of states reject the revival of a claim 
already barred by the statute of limitations under their state constitutions, the 
reasoning used to support such a blanket rejection varies by state.123  One sub-
category of these per se states is those that ground their opinion in constitutional 
provisions.124 
Seven of the per se states depart from the federal approach because of 
specific prohibitions against retroactive legislation in their own state 
 
furtherance of the remedy, by curing defects and adding to the means of enforcing existing 
obligations.”  Canton Textile Mills, Inc., 317 S.E.2d at 191–92 (citing Seabord Air Line Ry. v. 
Benton, 165 S.E. 593, 596 (Ga. 1932)). 
119.  For a discussion of the statute of limitations and constitutional prohibition against 
retroactive law in Georgia, see supra note 118 and accompanying text. 
120.  See Hartford Roman Catholic, 119 A.3d at 509 (“Iowa, West Virginia, and New 
Mexico, do not squarely ground their decisions in any particular state or federal constitutional 
provision.”). 
121.  See id. (discussing the rationale used by courts of Iowa, West Virginia, and New 
Mexico to support the approach to evaluating revival of time-barred claims).  The Iowa Supreme 
Court stated that statutes of limitation only affect the remedy, finding “[i]t is a statute of repose, 
one of presumption of nonexistence, or payment or discharge of the cause of action, and does 
not destroy the cause of action.”  See Schulte v. Wageman, 465 N.W.2d 285, 287 (Iowa 1991) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  In agreeing with the Supreme Court of the United States, 
New Mexico relied heavily on the Campbell decision “that a right to defeat an action for debt 
by a plea of the statute of limitations is not a property right nor a vested right, and may be taken 
away at will by the Legislature.”  See Orman v. Van Arsdell, 78 P. 48, 48 (N.M. 1904).   
Similarly, West Virginia has found that state tort law and the corresponding statutes of 
limitations do not require absolute stability.  See Pnakovich v. SWCC, 259 S.E.2d 127, 131 (W. 
Va. 1979) (noting stability is not necessary because the law “is re-written by the Legislature 
every session, [and] is an unsettled area of the law which does not reflect stability nor promote 
great reliance [on previous status of statute of limitations].”).  The Pnakovich court noted that, 
unlike property law, people do not conduct their behavior based on their knowledge of tort law.  
See id.  The court’s rationale was that a change in the statute of limitations for a tort will not 
affect a person’s behavior, and thus no right is infringed upon with retroactive statutes of 
limitations for torts.  See id. 
122.  See Hartford Roman Catholic, 119 A.3d at 510 (identifying twenty-four states that 
held that retroactive amendments of the statute of limits are per se invalid); see also supra note 
48 for definition of “per se.” 
123.  See Hartford Roman Catholic, 119 A.3d at 510 (discussing the statutory and 
constitutional support relied on by state courts to absolutely prohibit state legislatures from 
enacting retroactive extensions to statutes of limitations). 
124.  See id. at 510–11 (noting that the decisions of eighteen states to per se invalidate 
the retroactive revival of time-barred claims were grounded in interpretation of state 
constitutional provisions). 
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constitutions.125  Moreover, eleven per se states depart from the federal approach 
even further by holding that retroactive extensions of the statute of limitations are 
a direct infringement on a vested property right that is created under their state 
constitutions.126  In these states, once a claim has time-lapsed, the potential 
 
125.  See id. at 510 (discussing the reasoning used by seven states to support the per se 
invalid approach to retroactive extensions of statutes of limitations).  Alabama, Colorado, 
Missouri, New Hampshire, Oklahoma, Tennessee, and Texas each have state constitutional 
provisions that expressly prohibit retroactive legislations.  See id. (discussing the constitutional 
prohibition against retroactive legislation as justification for per se impermissibility of revival 
of time-barred actions); see also Johnson v. Garlock, Inc., 682 So.2d 25, 28 (Ala. 1996) 
(discussing Alabama’s constitutional provision against retroactivity and holding “[o]nce an 
action is barred by a statute of limitations . . . rights vest in the limitations defense which cannot 
be destroyed by subsequent legislative act because [of the relevant Alabama constitutional 
provision]” (quoting Tyson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 399 So.2d 263, 268–70 (Ala. 
1981))); Jefferson Cty. Dept. of Soc. Servs. v. D.A.G., 607 P.2d 1004, 1006 (Colo. 1980) 
(“Where a statute of limitations has run and the bar attached, ‘the right to plead it as a defense 
is a vested right which cannot be taken away or impaired by subsequent legislation.’” (quoting 
Willoughby v. George, 5 Colo. 80, 82 (1879))); Doe v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 862 S.W.2d 
338, 341–42 (Mo. 1993) (relying on the Missouri Constitution’s prohibition against retroactive 
legislation and stating “once the original statute of limitation expires and bars the plaintiff’s 
action, the defendant has acquired a vested right . . . that is substantive in nature” (citing Uber 
v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 441 S.W.2d 682, 683 (Mo. 1969))); Gould v. Concord Hosp., 493 A.2d 
1193, 1196 (N.H. 1985) (holding the amendment to limitations period after the period already 
expired impaired the  “defendants’ vested right to assert the limitations defense and would thus 
operate as an unconstitutional retrospective law”); Wright v. Keiser, 568 P.2d 1262, 1267 (Okla. 
1977) (finding legislative revival of an otherwise time-barred claim is an express violation of 
the Oklahoma constitution); Ford Motor Co. v. Moulton, 511 S.W.2d. 690, 696–97 (Tenn. 1974) 
(holding that the Tennessee constitutional prohibition against retroactivity bars extension of 
lapse limitations period when parties have the “right to ‘expect’ under the prior law they would 
not be sued”); Baker Hughes, Inc. v. Keco R. & D., Inc., 12 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Tex. 1999) (“A statute 
extending the limitations period of a claim already barred by limitations violates the Texas 
Constitution’s prohibition against retroactive laws . . . .”).   
126.  See Hartford Roman Catholic, 119 A.3d at 511 (discussing the reasoning used by 
courts in Arkansas, Florida, Illinois, Louisiana, Nebraska, North Carolina, Rhode Island, South 
Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, and Virginia).  Eleven states bar retroactive extensions to statutes 
of limitations because this statutory time-bar is considered a vested property right under each 
state constitution.  See id. (discussing the revival of time-lapsed claim in eleven states as 
“incursion on a vested property right that amounts to a per se violation of substantive due 
process” (citations omitted)); see also Johnson v. Lilly, 823 S.W.2d 883, 885 (Ark. 1992) 
(stating disagreement with federal approach and holding “legislature cannot expand a statute of 
limitation so as to revive a cause of action already barred” (citations omitted)); Wiley v. Roof, 
641 So.2d 66, 68 (Fla. 1994) (“Once an action is barred, a property right to be free from a claim 
has accrued.”); Doe A. v. Diocese of Dallas, 917 N.E.2d 475, 484 (Ill. 2009) (holding “[i]f the 
claims were time-barred under the old law, they remained time-barred even after the repose 
period was abolished by the legislature” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting M.E.H. v. 
L.H., 685 N.E.2d 335, 339 (Ill. 1997))); Henry v. SBA Shipyard, Inc., 24 So.3d 956, 960–61 
(La. Ct. App. 2009) (discussing retroactivity, substantive legislative change, and vested rights 
under Louisiana constitution); Givens v. Anchor Packing, Inc., 466 N.W.2d 771, 775 (Neb. 
1991) (stating the departure from vested right approach “tramples upon the vested rights of 
others”); Colony Hill Condo. Ass’n v. Colony Co., 320 S.E.2d 273, 276 (N.C. 1984) (discussing 
the prejudice to defendant’s due process rights through the revival of a time-barred claim); Kelly 
v. Marcantonio, 678 A.2d 873, 883 (R.I. 1996) (finding legislative revival of an already 
time-barred action infringes on defendant’s vested and substantive due process rights); Doe v. 
Crooks, 613 S.E.2d 536, 538 (S.C. 2005) (holding retroactive application of statutes of 
limitations that revive already barred actions infringes on a defendant’s due process rights under 
the South Carolina Constitution (citing Goff v. Mills, 308 S.E.2d 778, 780 (1983))); State of 
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defendant enjoys a vested property right and no longer needs to defend against a 
particular claim.127  Under this type of constitutional interpretation, unlike the 
federal approach, any infringement on that right to be free from suit is considered 
a violation of substantive due process and invalid legislation.128 
There are several states that hold retroactive extensions of the statute of 
limitations to be invalid per se without relying on their state constitutions to 
support this position.129  Five states embrace the per se invalid approach but do 
not cite any source in their constitution or general statutes that create a protected 
vested right.130  In these five states—Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, Oregon, and 
Pennsylvania—the complete prohibition against revival of time barred claims is 
 
Minnesota ex rel. Hove v. Doese, 501 N.W.2d 366, 370 (S.D. 1993) (“When a right to sue has 
expired under the applicable statute of limitations prior to the effective date of a new and longer 
statute, the new limitations period cannot revive the expired cause of action.”); Roark v. 
Crabtree, 893 P.2d 1058, 1063 (Utah 1995) (finding a vested right in defense of the statute of 
limitation under the Utah constitution); Starnes v. Cayouette, 419 S.E.2d 669, 674 (Va. 1992) 
(finding “substantive as well as vested rights are entitled to due process protection”).  
127.  See Hartford Roman Catholic, 119 A.3d at 511 (identifying states that grant 
defendants a vested property right in a time-barred claim). 
128.  Compare id. (finding no substantive right to statute of limitations defense under the 
state constitution), with Campbell v. Holt, 115 U.S. 620, 628–29 (1885), and Chase Sec. Corp. 
v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314 (1945) (establishing that lapsed statute of limitations do not 
create a substantive right under the federal constitution). 
129.  See Hartford Roman Catholic, 119 A.3d at 511 (noting Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, 
Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Vermont do not cite state constitutional provisions in leading cases 
on the revival of time-barred claims). 
130.  See id. (identifying states that absolutely prohibit the retroactive revival of claim 
time-barred by the statute of limitations without citing source of vested right within a state 
constitution or statute).  Indiana grounds its approach in a rule of construction rather than a 
specific statutory or constitutional provision that addresses the issue of retroactivity.  See Green 
v. Karol, 344 N.E.2d 106, 112 (Ind. App. 1976) (“The general rule is that the statute of 
limitations in force at the time of suit governs . . . .  However, it is well-established that if, while 
the old statute was in force and before plaintiff’s suit was commenced, plaintiff’s right of action 
was barred by that statute, no statute subsequently passed can renew defendant’s liability.” 
(citations omitted)).   
Several other states use similar rules of construction to reach the same conclusion as 
Indiana.  See, e.g., Hartford Roman Catholic, 119 A.3d at 511 (discussing the similarity in 
approaches used by Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, Pennsylvania, and Oregon); see also, e.g., 
Johnson v. Gans Furniture Indus., Inc., 114 S.W.3d 850, 854–55 (Ky. 2003) (“[A]n amendment 
that extends the period of limitation may be applied to a claim in which the period has 
not already run, it may not be applied to revive a claim that has expired without impairing vested 
rights.” (citations omitted)); Kiser v. Bartley Min. Co., 397 S.W.2d 56, 58 (Ky. 1965) 
(discussing the jurisdictional preference for the applicability of legislative amendment “to 
claims that arose before the amendment, where the previously existing limitation had not run 
on those claims at the time the amendment became effective” (citation omitted)); Dobson v. 
Quinn Freight Lines, Inc., 415 A.2d 814, 816 (Me. 1980) (discussing that, although there is a 
“constructional preference for prospective application,” “retroactive” statutes of limitations are 
not unconstitutional as long as they do not “change the legal consequences of acts or events that 
occurred prior to the effective date”); Nichols v. Wilbur, 473 P.2d 1022, 1022–23 (Or. 1970) 
(“‘It is clear from the decisions of the courts of this state as well as those of other jurisdictions 
that a person has no vested right in the running of a statute of limitations unless it has completely 
run and barred the action.’” (emphasis added) (quoting Davis & McMillan v. Indus. Acc. 
Comm’n, 246 P. 1046, 1047–48 (Cal. 1926))); Maycock v. Gravely Corp., 508 A.2d 330, 334 
(Pa. 1986) (“[A]fter an action has become barred by an existing statute of limitations, no 
subsequent legislation will remove the bar or revive the action.” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
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a rule of construction as opposed to a statutory or constitutional restriction.131  
Finally, Vermont’s prohibition on retroactive legislation is rooted in a state 
statutory provision, rather than any limitation imposed by the Vermont 
constitution.132 
C. The Mixed Approach: Is Timing Really Everything? 
The constitutional approaches used by New York and Wisconsin fall 
between the two extremes of the broad, permissible federal approach and the 
strict, absolute bar of the per se invalid rule.133  The New York and Wisconsin 
courts operate on a case-by-case basis, ultimately delivering a ruling that may be 
consistent with either the federal or per se invalid approach.134  New York’s 
“exceptional circumstance” standard and Wisconsin’s rational basis review do 
not automatically allow or prohibit retroactive extensions of statutes of limitation 
under their respective state constitutions.135 
New York’s exceptional circumstance standard allows the state legislature 
to revive an otherwise time-barred claim if it reasonably determines the 
circumstances surrounding the claim are exceptional.136  Additionally, to qualify 
as an exceptional circumstance, the potential plaintiff must demonstrate that a 
serious injustice would be suffered if the intent of the state legislature was not 
honored.137  Similar to the federal view, the New York statute of limitations does 
 
131.  For a discussion of the approaches and case law from Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, 
Oregon, and Pennsylvania, see supra note 130. 
132.  See Hartford Roman Catholic, 119 A.3d at 511 (summarizing the reasoning in a 
leading Vermont case on revival of time-barred claims); see also Murray v. Luzenac Corp., 830 
A.2d 1, 2 (Vt. 2003) (discussing the statutory scheme related to the retroactive amendment to 
limitation periods); Capron v. Romeyn, 409 A.2d 565, 566–67 (Vt. 1979) (applying a Vermont 
statute, rather than the state’s constitution, to the question of retroactive amendment to statutes 
of limitation). 
133.  See Hartford Roman Catholic, 119 A.3d at 512 (discussing the dichotomy between 
the federal approach and the per se invalid approach compared to the more flexible approaches 
used by New York and Wisconsin). 
134.  See id. (summarizing the approaches used by New York and Wisconsin).  For a 
detailed discussion of the New York and Wisconsin approaches, see infra notes 136–44 and 
accompanying text.  
135.  See Hartford Roman Catholic, 119 A.3d at 511 (discussing the legislative impact 
of the New York and Wisconsin approaches on retroactive amendments to statutes of limitations 
within each state). 
136.  See Gallewski v. H. Hentz & Co., 93 N.E.2d 620, 624 (N.Y. 1950) (discussing the 
“exceptional circumstances” standard).  The Court of Appeals of New York has reasoned: 
 
[T]he Legislature may constitutionally revive a personal cause of action where the 
circumstances are exceptional and are such as to satisfy the court that serious 
injustice would result to plaintiffs not guilty of any fault if the intention of the 
Legislature were not effectuated.  This is no inclusive and categorical rule such as 
that expressed in Campbell v. Holt . . . , which many State courts have been unwilling 
to accept.  The tests . . . leave the court free to approach each revival statute on its 
individual merits, is the light of its own peculiar circumstances and setting. 
 
Id. (footnotes omitted) (citing Robinson v. Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co., 144 N.E. 579, 580–
81 (N.Y. 1924)).  
137.  See id. at 624 (evaluating constitutionality of retroactive statutes of limitation by 
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not create a vested property right for a defendant but instead merely bars a remedy 
for a given claim so long as the statute is effective.138  However, the statute of 
limitations does not destroy the legislature’s right to change its view on the policy 
that was responsible for imposing the questioned time-bar in the first place.139  As 
a result, retroactive extensions are not barred under the New York Constitution 
per se but may be held unconstitutional when evaluating notions of serious 
injustice under the exceptional circumstance standard.140 
Unlike defendants in New York courts, Wisconsin defendants do possess a 
vested constitutional right when a statute of limitations has lapsed.141  Despite the 
classification as a vested right, a revival of a time-barred claim may still be 
permissible under the Wisconsin constitution if the revival passes a rational basis 
review.142  As a result, the vested right created by the statute of limitations is not 
absolute in Wisconsin and must be balanced against the state’s legitimate interest 
in addressing a given issue.143  When applying rational basis review to retroactive 
statutes of limitation, Wisconsin courts weigh the private interests that will be 
damaged by the retroactive aspects of the law and the public interest to be served 
by the retroactive extension.144 
IV. CRITICAL ANALYSIS: TIME TO SYNCHRONIZE OUR WATCHES 
The federal constitutional approach to evaluating due process challenges to 
retroactive extensions of statutes of limitation provides a workable framework 
that should be adopted by all states, especially in the context of institutional 
CSA.145  Although individual state constitutions control state civil tort claims, 
rather than the U.S. Constitution, the due process analysis established in 
Campbell and Chase Securities offers state citizens, legislatures, and courts a 
flexible approach without offending the primary purpose of statutes of 
 
determining whether a circumstance is exceptional and would cause a plaintiff serious injustice 
if their claim continued to be time-barred). 
138.  See Campbell v. Holt, 115 U.S. 620, 628–29 (1885) (finding no vested property 
right to statutes of limitation defense under the Fourteenth Amendment); Thomas v. Bethlehem 
Steel Corp., 470 N.E.2d 831, 837 (N.Y. 1984) (“Unlike a judgement, however, the running of 
a Statute of Limitations creates no such vested or property right.”). 
139.  See Thomas, 470 N.E.2d at 837–38 (“[A]though it bars a remedy on the claim so 
long as it remains effective, [the statute of limitations] does not destroy the right or foreclose a 
change in the legislative policy which resulted in imposition of the bar.” (citations omitted)). 
140.  See Gallewski, 93 N.E.2d at 623–24 (holding the “exceptional circumstances” test 
is the appropriate standard for weighing validity of the revival of time-barred claims under the 
New York constitution). 
141.  See Soc’y Ins. v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm’n, 786 N.W.2d 385, 399–402 (Wis. 
2010) (holding the time-bar imposed by the statute of limitations is a substantive right protected 
by the Wisconsin constitution). 
142.  See id. at 401–02 (discussing the balancing test and public interest considerations 
served by the retroactive extension of the statute of limitations). 
143.  See id. at 397 (indicating that a “substantive, or vested, property right is not 
dispositive for due process purposes” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
144.  See id. (identifying the relevant factors for rational basis review). 
145.  For a discussion of the federal approach rooted in the decisions in Campbell and 
Chase Securities, see supra notes 79–112 and accompanying text. 
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limitation.146  The federal approach allows young children who have been 
sexually victimized to have their day in court, despite the pressing psychological 
and emotional barriers that may have prevented them from speaking about their 
abuse within the limitations period.147  By allowing legislative changes in policy 
in regards to the statute of limitations, the federal approach gives victims an 
opportunity to overcome these very real obstacles.148  At the same time, it would 
recognize that institutions like the Catholic Church or Penn State cannot find a 
vested right to a limitations defense merely because a victim has yet to come 
forward.149 
In the context of CSA, time should not be interpreted as a vested state 
constitutional right that allows an institution to escape liability for its role in the 
sexual victimization of children.150  Those states that elevate a time-bar from a 
remedy to a constitutionally protected substantive right should be aware of the 
very real implications such an interpretation has on sexually abused children.151 
Children, and in many cases, adults, who were sexually abused at a young age 
but are not ready to retain counsel and file a civil complaint until after 
adolescence should not have to face a “buzzer-beater” situation when it comes to 
seeking justice.152 
Those per se states, which do not permit retroactive extensions of the statute 
of limitations because of statutory provisions or judicial rules of construction, 
should repeal and replace those binding standards to accommodate victims of 
child sexual abuse.153  Such legislative and judicial action would provide victims 
 
146.  See Order of R.R. Tels. v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 348–49 (1994) 
(“Statutes of limitation, like the equitable doctrine of laches, in their conclusive effects are 
designed to promote justice by preventing surprises through the revival of claims that have been 
allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have 
disappeared.”). 
147.  See Hamilton, supra note 10, at 429 (noting many victims of child sexual abuse 
may “need decades to come forward” or to recognize the “connection between their typically 
serious problems in adulthood and the sexual abuse that occurred as a child”). 
148.  See Campbell v. Holt, 115 US. 620, 628–29 (1885) (finding no vested right to the 
statute of limitations time-bar defense under the Fourteenth Amendment); see also Chase Sec. 
Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314 (1945) (finding no unconstitutional infringement on the 
vested property right of the defendant through legislative revival of a previously time-barred 
claim). 
149.  See Campbell v. Holt, 115 US. 620, 628–29 (1885); see also Chase Sec. Corp. v. 
Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314 (1945); see also Scott Malone & Philip Pullella, The Catholic 
Church is Fighting to Block Bills that would Extend the Statute of Limitations for Reporting Sex 
Abuse, REUTERS (Sept. 2015), http://www.businessinsider.com/r-as-pope-visit-nears-us-sex-
victims-say-church-remains-obstacle-to-justice-2015-9 [https://perma.cc/28A9-DN6T] 
(discussing the Roman Catholic Church’s efforts to use “its legal and political clout to oppose 
bills that would extend the statute of limitations for victims of child sex abuse”). 
150.  For a discussion of state constitutional interpretations which categorize a statute of 
limitations time lapse as a vested right, see supra notes 113–21 and accompanying text. 
151.  See Hamilton, supra note 10, at 431 (“Legions of victims of child sex abuse have 
learned that when they were finally ready to talk to a prosecutor or a lawyer, the . . . statutes of 
limitations . . . had already expired.  Across the United States, one victim after another has been 
surprised by these technical, legal deadlines.”). 
152.  See id. at 432 (“[M]any states have been working to extend their child sex abuse 
SOLs, because there is always a new victim with a compelling story that shows lawmakers the 
folly of having any SOL for the crime of child sex abuse.” (emphasis added)). 
153.  See, e.g., Bublick, supra note 16, at 308 (arguing child victims of sexual abuse 
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and society with a judicial platform to increase accountability within institutions 
responsible for those heinous acts.154  While remaining as fair as possible to the 
defendant, legislatures and courts can limit the application of new legislation to 
civil CSA claims without allowing plaintiffs to revive other time-barred 
claims.155 
Finally, the federal approach authorizes state legislatures to retroactively 
expand the statute of limitations for a claim but still accounts for legislative 
discretion in any context of a proposed limitations period change.156  Although 
there is a risk that all time-barred claims may potentially be revived, every 
proposed extension, as with any piece of legislation, will be subject to the 
political and legislative process.157  If states are concerned that a reclassification 
of the statute of limitations from a right to a remedy presents a slippery slope that 
will destroy the statute of limitations defense for claims that are truly antiquated 
and not fit for adjudication, the mixed approaches of New York and Wisconsin 
offer a reasonable alternative.158 
The New York and Wisconsin approaches allow potential defendants to be 
treated fairly, given the particular context of the claim and statute, while still 
authorizing the legislature to enact laws that will hold institutions with a record 
of CSA accountable for their past transgressions.159  Factors such as justice, 
accountability, deterrence, and the safety of our nation’s youth are all relevant 
and reasonable considerations a state court should be able to weigh against a 
 
should not bear any responsibility for any portion of abuse); Miller, supra note 17, at 600–01 
(noting that reviving time-barred claims would allow victims to get retribution against their 
attackers).  Pennsylvania state representative Mark Rozzi alleges being raped by a priest in a 
shower when he was thirteen years old.  See Malone & Pullella, supra note 149.  Rozzi is now 
leading the way in the Penssylvania legislature in an effort to extend the statutory of limitations 
period in Pennyslvania.  See id.  Rozzi himself was unable to pursue any legal action against 
his alleged abuser because by the time he was ready to talk publicly about the incident 
twenty-five years and the statute of limitations period had passed.  See id.   
154.  See Bublick, supra note 16, at 302–07 (proposing that civil accountability of 
negligent actors and abusers involved in civil sexual assault cases should be preserved by courts 
and legislatures to promote the deterrence of behavior that subjects children to safety risks). 
155.  See Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314 (1945) (discussing the role 
of legislative policy and changes to that policy when enacting retroactive extensions to the 
statute of limitations). 
156.  See id. at 315–16 (acknowledging that legislatures enact policies that are 
disadvantageous to some parties yet finding that this disadvantage is not an infringement on the 
federal constitutional right to be immune from suit). 
157.  Cf. Marci A. Hamilton, Summary of Statutes of Limitations Reform Across the 
United States (May 3, 2016), CARDOZO LAW, http://solreform.com/snapshot.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4V5F-8PMM] (last visited Mar. 20, 2018) (noting legislatures that amended 
statutes of limitations for CSA cases). 
158.  See Gallewski v. H. Hentz & Co., 93 N.E.2d 620, 624 (N.Y. 1950) (emphasizing 
the importance of exceptional circumstances in evaluating the constitutionality of revival 
actions); see also Soc’y Ins. v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm’n, 786 N.W.2d 385, 401–02 
(Wis. 2010) (considering the public interest served by the infringement on a defendant’s vested 
property right using rational basis review). 
159.  See Gallewski, 93 N.E.2d at 624 (analyzing the constitutionality of revival actions 
using the exceptional circumstance standard rather than the per se determination); see also Soc’y 
Ins., 786 N.W.2d at 396 & 396 n.12 (analyzing the constitutionality of revival actions using the 
rational basis test rather than the per se determination). 
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defendant’s right to plead a statute of limitations defense.160  However, the current 
law in far too many states fail to incorporate these important factors and allow 
their state constitutions to serve as a shield from holding institutions accountable 
for CSA.161 
V. CONCLUSION: TIME FLIES (WHEN STATE CONSTITUTIONS  
ALLOW TIME TO FLY) 
Because of the nature of CSA claims against third-party institutions and the 
prolonged period it typically takes until the abuse is reported, CSA should not be 
considered a typical antiquated claim that may have lost its relevancy and ability 
to be properly addressed by a court over time.162  The trauma, devastation, and 
ongoing predatory nature of these actions make this a timeless issue for victims, 
advocates, and those institutions that are hoping to right their wrongs.163  State 
constitutions should be interpreted to establish a structure that protects the 
children of our country, not act as the strongest shield from accountability and 
liability for those who contributed to their sexual victimization.164 
Permitting retroactive legislation under the constitution of a given state is 
crucial to provide CSA victims a platform to hold wrongdoers accountable.165  
 
160.  See Gallewski, 93 N.E.2d at 624–25 (discussing factors such as the legislative 
interest in tort causes of action generally, a defendant’s interest in statute of limitations defense, 
circumstances surrounding causes of actions, and “elementary notions of justice and fairness”); 
see also Soc’y Ins., 786 N.W.2d at 397–98 (considering factors such as public interest, private 
interest, reliance on previously settled laws, and the right to recover damages in the context of 
pressing economic or social issues). 
161.  See Doe v. Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 119 A.3d 462, 510–11 (Conn. 
2015) (“[T]wenty-four states support the position that legislation that retroactively amends a 
statute of limitations in a way that revives time barred claims is per se invalid.”). 
162.  See Order of R.R. Tels. v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 348–49 (1994) 
(discussing the primary purpose of the statute of limitations in providing a defendant the “right 
to be free of stale claims”).  In Order of Railroad Telegraphers, the Court noted that, although 
the delayed time period between the event triggering the cause of action and the actual claim 
filing was notably long and “regrettable,” the exigent circumstances causing the delay are 
relevant to statute of limitation time-bars.  See id. at 349 (finding the long delay in bringing the 
suit was “caused by the exigencies of the contest, not by the neglect to proceed”).  Such an 
exigent circumstance is embodied in the unique nature of the lasting impacts on CSA victims.  
See Alexandra Hunstein Roffman, The Evolution and Unintended Consequences of Legal 
Responses to Childhood Sexual Abuse: Seeking Justice and Prevention, 34 CHILD. LEGAL RTS. 
J. 301, 305 (2014) (“The secretive nature of child sex abuse and the propensity of children to 
hold onto that secret for years at a time create unique circumstances.”). 
163.  See Ferrante, supra note 16, at 200–01 (“[C]hildren subjected to repeated acts of 
sexual abuse suffer physically, psychologically and emotionally, often repressing the episodes 
of sexual abuse in order to avoid dealing with the pain and trauma caused by the abuse.”); see 
also JEROME KROLL, PTSD/BORDERLINES IN THERAPY: FINDING THE BALANCE 54 (1993) 
(“[V]iolent, prolonged, or intrusive abuse . . . represents stressors that are beyond the adaptive 
capacities of all but the most exceptional children and that will regularly produces a long-lasting 
traumatic syndrome.”); Roffman, supra note 162, at 305 (identifying a victim’s own shame and 
embarrassment about their abuse as a primary reason a child does not come forward at or near 
the time they are abused). 
164.  See Bublick, supra note 16, at 310 (“[W]hen asking the civil responsibility question 
in a way that seeks to prevent child sexual abuse, courts should retain the accountability of third 
parties.”). 
165.  See Hamilton, supra note 10, at 433 (“[Statute of limitations] reform does far more 
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Institutions that supervise sexual predators will be deterred from continuing 
practices that may have contributed to a child’s abuse if legislatures are 
constitutionally authorized to revive time-barred claims.166  Similarly, the 
possibility of civil liability will encourage these institutions to genuinely reform 
their organizations to prevent future instances of abuse, creating a safer 
environment for our nation’s youth.167 
State constitutions should not shield wrongdoers when it comes to actions as 
heinous as CSA.168  Retroactive revival of time-barred claims provides an 
incentive for offending institutions to clean up their organization at the risk of 
facing liability for actions that may have occurred long ago but still have lasting 
impacts.169  In these instances, deterrence not only comes in the form of being 
publicly held accountable, but also in the form of monetary damages that a court 
may award to a plaintiff who was sexually victimized as a young child.170 
The Supreme Court of the United States has established a constitutional 
approach to retroactive extensions of statutes of limitation that would allow state 
legislatures to deter and prevent child sexual abuse through state constitutions.171  
 
than create justice for victims in the past.  It also forestalls future abuse of today’s children.  It 
gives victims their day in court and levels the playing field between individual and institutional 
entities that cause abuse and the victims.”). 
166.  See Miller, supra note 17, at 600–01 (noting how retroactive statutes of limitations 
would allow victims “to obtain some form of retribution against the abusers” (citation omitted)); 
see also Bublick, supra note 16, at 310 (“Courts and legislatures can do something to protect 
children from abuse by retaining institutional accountability and not permitting that 
responsibility to be shifted back to criminals . . . or to vulnerable children who suffered 
abuse.”); Wilson, supra note 53, at 518 (identifying legislative intent supporting some sexual 
abuse laws as deterrent to potential offenders and discouragement of previous offenders from 
repeating illegal actions). 
167.  See Bublick, supra note 16, at 310 (“[W]hen asking the civil responsibility question 
in a way that seeks to prevent child sexual abuse, courts should retain the accountability of third 
parties.”). 
168.  See Garry, supra note 57, at 7 (discussing how state constitutions “set up the basic 
organization of government, outline various government duties, and specify and protect 
individual rights”).  “With their unique histories and varied cultural backgrounds, state 
constitutions often provide broader protections for individual rights than does the more 
process-oriented U.S. Constitution.”  See id.  As both a survivor of CSA and a state legislator, 
Pennsylvania Representative Mark Rozzi commented on his personal experience with the 
Pennsylvania statute of limitations saying, “When I was [thirteen] years old and I was standing 
in the shower getting raped with my best friend outside the door, do you think I knew what a 
statute of limitations was?”  See Malone, supra note 149. 
169.  See Bublick, supra note 16, at 310–11 (arguing that state law should apportion 
liability to institutions to hold them accountable); cf. Sloan et al., supra note 564, at 473–74 
(explaining that a law must be sufficiently threatening to preclude an actor from undertaking 
the prohibited behavior). 
170.  See, e.g., Robert D. Cooter, Punitive Damages for Deterrence: When and How 
Much, 40 ALA. L. REV. 1143, 1146–47 (1989) (noting the deterrent effect of punitive damages); 
Richard S. Gruner, Beyond Fines: Innovative Corporate Sentences Under Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 261, 322 (1993) (noting the deterrent effect of negative 
publicity).  But see Sloan et al., supra note 54, at 498 (noting deterrent effects stemming from 
tort liability has not been researched extensively but arguing “the theoretical analyses of tort as 
a deterrent are quite optimistic about its effects”). 
171.  See Doe v. Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 119 A.3d 462, 509 (Conn. 
2015) (finding the federal approach to revival of time-barred actions “allow[s] the retroactive 
expansion of the statute of limitations to revive otherwise time-lapsed claims—seemingly 
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It is important to understand that legislative policy and constitutional 
interpretation are not the cure-alls for the issues of pedophilia or organizational 
corruption underlying institutional sex abuse.172  However, the public relation and 
economic implications attached to these legal measures present an opportunity to 
create an environment where children do not have to fear the very same people 
that were meant to protect them. 
 
 
without limitation” (emphasis added)). 
172.  See, e.g., Andrea Friedman, Pedophilia: Laws Fighting Nature Instead of Coping 
with it, 43 SW. L. REV. 253, 268 (2013) (arguing the reform of laws related to pedophilia should 
consider the complex scientific background of pedophilia that “is a biological condition 
developed before birth”). 
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